| Miêu tả |
The economic literature suggests that in markets where legal institutions are weak, such as Vietnam, parties will rely on private ordering to assure performance of complex transactions. This paper examines fruit markets in the Mekong Delta. While transactions in this market could be simple (spot market transactions), parties frequently make them more complex by adding a credit component. A survey of 180 farmers and 47 middlemen in the Mekong Delta’s pomelo fruit market produces little evidence that private ordering mechanisms are playing a substantial role in assuring contractual performance in somewhat complex market transactions. As a result, in the absence of credible legal institutions and effective private ordering mechanisms, there are significant transaction costs built into the pomelo market. This paper recommends the creation of a simple reputation mechanism, not unlike those now employed in online auction markets, which, if implemented, can improve efficiencies in the market while lowering risks for both farmers and middlemen.
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| Báo cáo |
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